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THE RELEVANCE OF THE FRAMERS' INTENT 
RANDY E. BARNE'IT* 
Ever since the revival of interest in originalism that occurred in 
the 1980s, critics have 'charged that for a variety of reasons it is 
impractical, if not impossible, to determine the Framers' inten-
tions. 1 In addition, they argue that we today should not be bound 
by the intentions of a few men who lived and died over two-hun-
dred years ago.2 In sum, adherence to original intent is rejected 
as being impractical, unjust, or both. 
In this Article, I will argue that we cannot assess either the prac-
ticality or the justice of discerning original intent without first ask-
ing why it is we are consulting the intentions of the Framers. I 
shall discuss two reasons to consult the Framers. The first views 
the Framers as wardens; the second as designers or architects. 
I. THE FRAMERS AS WARDENS 
Let me begin by posing a question: does a law enacted by Con-
gress and signed by the President create a duty of obedience in 
the people? Would it be appropriate not merely to punish, but 
also to condemn a person who disobeys a law for having done 
something morally wrong? To put the matter starkly, did the 
Branch Davidians in Waco have a duty in conscience to submit to 
the commands of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms 
agents who came calling one morning? Did Randy Weaver do 
something wrong, not merely illegal, when he failed to surrender 
to the U.S. Marshals who approached his cabin or to the FBI 
agents who then surrounded it? 
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of law. 
I. See, e.g., RoNALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 317-24 (1986) (describing the practical dif-
ficulties in identifying an authoritative intention of the framers oflegislation); Paul Brest, 
The Misconceived Qpestfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 213-17 (1980) 
(same, as applied to the Framers of the Constitution). 
2. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theary of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 
277, 357 (1985) ("The dead hand of the past ought not to govern, for example, our 
treatment of the liberty of free speech, and any theory of interpretation that demands 
that it does is a bad theory."); larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution, 
73 CAL. L. REv. 1482, 1499-500 (1985) ("The Constitution was adopted by propertied, 
white males who had no strong incentives to attend to the concerns and interests of the 
impoverished, the nonwhites, or nonmales who were alive then, much less those of us 
alive today who hold conceptions of our interests and selves very different from the ones 
held by those in the original clique."). 
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Although most constitutional scholars do not consider these 
sorts of questions explicitly, those attracted to originalism imply 
that a law creates a duty of obedience if it reflects the wiii of the 
people.3 In practice, this means the will of the majority of the 
people. What, then, is the role of the Constitution? According to 
this view, the Constitution places limits on what laws a majority 
may impose on the people, but these limits are themselves a re-
flection of majority will; the Constitution reflects the will of the 
majority who elected representatives to state constitutional con-
ventions, a majority of whom, in turn, voted to ratify the Consti-
tution. Because the Constitution, like a statute, is viewed as a 
command from the majority, we need to determine the inten-
tions of those who issued the command to determine its 
meaning. 
Of course, as many have noted, this is exceedingly difficult to 
do.4 How exactly does one determine the collective intentions of 
thousands of persons who elected hundreds of representatives 
who then voted to ratify the Constitution in thirteen different 
assemblies-not to mention the intentions of those who voted 
for thousands of state legislators who in turn voted to ratify the 
various constitutional amendments at different points in our 
history? 
As a surrogate, we consult the statements made by various 
members of the constitutional convention, supplemented per-
haps by statements made by members of ratification conventions, 
with the assumption that others shared these stated views. But 
these arguments can get extremely complicated. Witness, for ex-
ample, my debate with Professor Thomas McAffee concerning 
3. Because the claim is usually implicit, it is difficult to document. One example is 
Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, As Perceived fly Randy Barnett, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1508, 
1533 (1994) ("Ours, the Declaration of Independence declared, is a government that 
derives its powers from the 'consent of the governed.' That consent was given by the 
Ratification Conventions."). 
Another writer who has made the connection between popular will and legitimacy 
more explicit is Robert Bork: 
It is asserted .•. that the judicial philosophy of original understanding is fatally 
defective in any number of respects. If that were so, if the Constitution cannot 
be law that binds judges, there would remain only one democratically legitimate 
solution: judicial supremacy, the power of the courts to invalidate statutes and 
executive actions in the name of the Constitution, would have to be abandoned. 
For the choice would then be either rule by judges according to their own 
desires or rule by the people according to theirs. 
RoBERT H. BoRK, THE l'EMPnNG OF AMERICA 160 (1990). 
4. See, e.g., DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 315-23; Brest, supra note 1, at 213-17. 
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the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment's protection of 
the rights "retained by the people."5 
Moreover, the difficulties in discerning the Framers' intentions 
increase both as time elapses and as we need to get more specific. 
Would the Framers have considered a wiretap to be a "search"?6 
Would they have considered flag-burning to be a form of 
"speech"?7 Would they have considered cable television to be a 
form of "the press"?8 We make these specific inquiries because 
we view the Framers as wardens having issued commands, the 
meaning of which depends on their intentions. 
In response to these difficulties in answering very specific ques-
tions concerning the Framers' intent, proponents of originalism 
employ a number of techniques. Often, in the absence of evi-
dence, a hypothetical group of framers is consulted-as in, "The 
Framers would have been shocked to learn that the First Amend-
ment protects [fill in the blank]."9 One may think of this as a 
type of constitutional "channeling" in which originalist 
clairvoyants ask: "Oh Framers, tell us what would you think about 
the following law?" 
To get around the problem of specificity, some originalists 
adopt the presumption that, if a subject is not specifically men-
5. For my contribution, see Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: Implementing the Ninth 
Amendment, in 2 THE R.!GIITS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE 
NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993); Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: james 
Madison !5 Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGIITS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND 
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). For Professor McAf-
fee's responses, see Thomas B. McAffee, The BiU of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the 
Rights "Retained" l:rj the People, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 267 (1992); Thomas B. McAffee, The Origi-
nalMeaningoftheNinthAmendment, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1215 (1990); Thomas B. McAffee, 
Prolegomena flJ a Meaningful Debate of the "Unwritten Constitution" Thesis, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 
107 (1992). 
6. Cf. U.S. CaNST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated .••• "). 
7. Cf. U.S. CaNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law •.. abridging the freedom of 
speech .•• .''). 
8. Cf. U.S. CaNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom 
•.. of the press .••. "). 
9. Although this is typically done orally in speeches and lectures, for a published exam-
ple of this approach to the contention that the Ninth Amendment authorizes judicial 
protection of the unenumerated rights retained by the people, consider Judge Bork's 
statement: 
[I]t is inconceivable that men who viewed the judiciary as a relatively insignifi-
cant branch could have devised, without even discussing the matter, a system, 
known nowhere else on earth, under which judges were given uncontrolled 
power to override the decisions of the democratic branches by finding authority 
outside the written Constitution. 
BaRK, supra note 3, at 185. 
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tioned in the text of the Constitution, it is said to be "silent" on 
the issue and the government therefore has plenary power to do 
what it wishes.10 So because the Constitution does not mention 
flag-burning or cable television-or marijuana or contraception 
for that matter-it is presumed that the majority, acting through 
its representatives in government, may regulate or prohibit these 
activities as it pleases. Because the Constitution does not mention 
wiretaps or electronic smveillance, the government is not re-
stricted by the Fourth Amendment in using these technologies. 
Thus the difficulties surrounding original intent are resolved by a 
simple default rule that favors enhanced governmental power 
whenever the Framers' opposition to such activity by government 
cannot be divined. 
Notice how this originalist method leads to what can only be 
described as-well-the Leviathan: a Hobbesian result that 
would have shocked the conscience of all the hypothetical Fram-
ers I have consulted on the subject. Yet many originalists seem 
unembarrassed by this disconnection between the results of their 
methodology and the views of limited government that were uni-
versally accepted by the founding generation. 
Despite these well-known weaknesses of originalism, there is 
something curious about the appeal of the Framers' intentions 
that is worth stopping for a moment to consider. In my experi-
ence, persons from every political group and interpretive school 
are fascinated by the intentions of the Framers. They are not, 
however, particularly interested in the intentions of delegates to 
state ratification conventions or the attitudes of the general pop-
ulation at the time of the framing. 
This suggests to me that we are interested in the Framers' in-
tentions not because they are a surrogate for the difficult-to-dis-
cern will of the majority of 1789, but because we respect their 
opinions. Perhaps they are "authorities," not in the sense that a 
statute is said to be authority, but in the sense that Story, Kent, 
Williston, Wigmore, and Corbin are authorities. We respect their 
opinions because we think they knew what they were talking 
about. The weight of their expertise, knowledge, and reflection 
influences us in a way that sheer mt9ority will cannot. That the 
10. See, e.g., id. at 150 ("Democratic choice must be accepted by the judge where the 
Constitution is silent."); id. at 259 ("[W]here the Constitution does not speak, the major-
ity morality prevails."); id. at 345 ("[W]here the Constitution is silent, the people must 
decide through legislation."). 
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Framers advocated a particular idea suggests to us that it is a good 
idea, not merely that it reflected the preferences of the biggest or . 
strongest group. 
With this in mind, let me sketch my view of the Framers as 
Designers. 
II. THE FRAMERS AS DESIGNERS 
Suppose that instead of viewing the Constitution as represent-
ing a command by a long-ago Illi!iority whose intentions we need 
somehow to discern, we view the Constitution as the blueprint 
for a machine that was designed to perform a certain function. 
In this case, the machine is designed to make laws to accomplish 
certain ends-laws that are supposed to be binding in con-
science upon the citizenry.U 
Think of the Constitution the way you might think of a 
machine designed to make sausages. We want a sausage-making 
machine to provide us with food, but we also want to ensure that 
the sausages the machine produces are wholesome and un-
tainted by disease. Because we do not want to have to inspect 
each and every sausage to see if it is wholesome, we want a 
machine whose design gives us confidence that it produces good 
sausages. 
Similarly, a constitution specifies the design of a mechanism to 
produce laws that are beneficial but not u:r~ust; laws that, be-
cause they are both necessary and proper,I2 bind us in con-
science. Yet because we cannot inspect every law individually, we 
need some confidence that the internal operation of the lawmak-
ing process is designed to produce beneficial laws and to weed 
out those that violate the rights retained by the people. Only a 
constitution that establishes a lawmaking process with the requi-
site built-in quality controls can impart legitimacy on the laws en-
acted in its name.13 A constitution that fails to contain such 
internal quality control procedures tells us nothing about the jus-
tice of the laws it produces. We may obey, like the Holmesian 
11. I explain and defend this conception of the Constitution in Randy E. Barnett, Get-
ting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudicatian, 12 CoNsr. CoMMEN-
TARY 93 (1995). 
12. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A jurisdic-
tional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE LJ. 267 (1993) (explaining the original 
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
13. See Barnett, supra note 11, at 105 ("[T]he requisite binding quality must go in 
before the name 'law' goes on."). 
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"bad man, "14 to avoid punishment, but not because we are 
bound in conscience to do so. 
By this approach, the Framers are viewed as designers or archi-
tects of the lawmaking "machine." We consult them when we 
want to know how the machine is supposed to work, not because 
they are a surrogate for the majority of the people who lived two-
hundred years ago, but because they might have special insight 
into the machine that they designed-especially its internal qual-
ity-control procedures. They gave its purpose and design much 
thought-perhaps more thought than we have-and we benefit 
from their learning in interpreting their design. 
More important, however, in designing this machine, the 
Framers adhered to certain basic principles, analogous to princi-
ples of engineering. These principles are either sound or un-
sound. Adhering to them leads either to laws that bind in 
conscience or to ones that do not. If they are sound, we must 
continue to operate the machine according to these principles or 
we will pay a heavy price. 
Consider another analogy: by cutting the cables on a suspen-
sion bridge we risk collapsing the bridge because we are violating 
the principles that the bridge designers engineered into the 
structure. The designers' intentions do not bind us, but their de-
sign does. Assuming we share the designers' objectives, we cut 
the cables at our peril. Similarly, by eliminating the safeguards 
built into the constitutional structure by its Framers, we risk the 
adverse consequences they consciously sought to avoid. 
We need to learn about and adhere to the principles of the 
Framers, then, not because they rule us from the grave, but be-
cause the principles they discovered and embodied in their 
machine are as valid and useful today as they were then. If the 
laws produced by their machine bind us, they do so because they 
were produced by a machine that still adheres to the sound prin-
ciples of lawmaking that the Framers devised. 
Notice some of the advantages of the Framers-as-Designers way 
oflooking at the Framers' intent. First, it explains why we remain 
so fascinated and influenced by the views of the small group of 
14. SeeOliverW. Holmes,Jr., The Path oftheLaw,lO HARv. L. REv. 457,459 (1897) ("If 
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares 
only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as 
a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in 
the vaguer sanctions of conscience."). 
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persons who framed-as opposed to ratified-the Constitution 
(as well as the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
Indeed, we generally confine our attention to just a handful of 
the Framers, such as James Madison or James Wilson or George 
Mason, as opposed to the views of other members of the conven-
tion or of the reigning mcyority of the time. We listen to them 
more carefully than others because we respect their opinion, es-
pecially the opinion of the chief architect or designer, James 
Madison. 
Second, ~is Framers-as-Designers approach answers the ques-
tion why we are bound by the decisions of a few dead white 
males. The anS\ver is that we are not bound by their decisions per 
se. Instead, if their principles are correct and we seek what they 
sought, then we must adhere to the principles they discovered 
and embodied in the Constitution. In sum, we are bound by the 
correctness of their principles, not by their source, though we con-
sult their source to discern what exactly these principles are and 
to understand them better. 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that scholars and ac-
tivists who reject the Framers' views of limited government seek to 
undermine the operation of the machine they designed to effec-
tuate these views. By the same token, some who share the Fram-
ers' views of liberty might think them to have been mistaken in 
certain of their design decisions-for example, in refusing to 
abolish slavery, by failing to provide congressional term limits, or 
by failing to find some means of protecting citizens from abuse 
by their state governments. 
Third, according to the Framers-as-Designers approach, we 
consult the writings of the Framers to discern not their specific 
hypothetical intentions towards particular legislation, but the 
principles that they designed into the constitutional structure we 
interpret. Among these principles are federalism, separation of 
powers, judicial review, and freedom of speech and religion. I 
would add to this frequently cited list the principle embodied in 
the Tenth Amendment15-that the government of the United 
States is supposed to be limited to the delegated powers-which 
15. U.S. CoNsr. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people."). 
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undermines any interpretation of the Commerce Clause16 that 
gives plenary power to Congress. And it should come as no sur-
prise that I also would emphasize the principle embodied in the 
Ninth Amendmentl7-that constitutional protection of liberty is 
not limited to the few liberties that were mentioned expressly in 
the constitutional text, but that this protection extends to all the 
other rights retained by the people as well. 
We are quite capable today of discerning the meaning and the 
merit of these general principles. Perhaps, after seeing them vio-
lated for sixty years, we can even appreciate these principles bet-
ter. If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the misery and 
injustice created by the modern welfare state is testimony to the 
wisdom of the Framers. Indeed, one indicator of the obviousness 
of the Framers' principles is the convoluted theories that have 
been invented to supplant them, such as the theory that the Sec-
ond Amendment protection of the people's right to keep and bear 
arms18 ·was intended to protect the States' power to maintain a 
militia.19 
In sum, provided we are looking for the right intentions and 
for the right reasons, a commitment to original intent is not 
barred by the indeterminacy of historical materials. We should 
look to the Framers' intentions, not because we are bound by 
their intentions as such, but because we today share their inten-
tions to limit the power of government in a way that enhances 
and protects the liberty of the people. We are "bound" to adhere 
to their principles because they are as vital to protecting liberty as 
the principles by which one designs a bridge are to preventing its 
collapse. We ignore them at our peril. 
16. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ••. To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the severnl States, and with the Indian 
Tribes ••.. "). 
17. U.S. CoNsr. amend IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). 
18. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,"), 
19. For an example of this argument, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrru· 
TIONAL LAw 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988). The extensive historical evidence to the contrary is 
summarized in Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1983); see also Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the 
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 461 (1995) (summarizing recent Second Amendment 
scholarship). 
